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Abstract—Supported by the technical development of electric
battery and charging facilities, plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) has
the potential to be mobile energy storage (MES) for energy deliv-
ery from resourceful charging stations (RCSs) to limited-capacity
charging stations (LCSs). In this paper, we study the problem of
using on-road PEVs as MESs for energy compensation service
to compensate charging station (CS) overload. A price-incentive
scheme is proposed for power system operator (PSO) to stimulate
on-road MESs fulfilling energy compensation tasks. The price-
service interaction between the PSO and MESs is characterized
as a one-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game. The PSO
acts as a leader to schedule on-road MESs by posting service
price and on-road MESs respond to the price by choosing their
service amount. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium are validated, and an algorithm is developed to find
the equilibrium. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme in utility optimization and overload mitigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the advancement of electric battery technology
pushes forward the prevalence of plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs) in the automobile market [1]. The increasing PEV
charging demand, especially at peak hours, puts great pressure
on the charging stations (CSs) that have limited charging
capacities. The potential overload at CS feeders could incur
severe power quality issues and transformer degradation [2].
Therefore, additional power supply is required by infras-
tructure upgrade such as deploying flexible energy storages.
Thanks to the experimental success of the bi-directional
charger, the PEV can transmit energy from its rechargeable
battery to the power system as a mobile energy storage
(MES) [3], [4]. When limited-capacity CSs (LCSs) encounter
power shortages in peak hours, MESs can deliver energy
from CSs with redundant power (i.e., resourceful CSs (RCSs))
to LCSs. By fully utilizing the system energy resource,
potential overload issues at LCSs can be mitigated without
excessive infrastructure upgrade expenditure. As the PEV
commercialization proceeds, and PEV becomes one of regular
transportation options, a considerable portion of on-road PEVs
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can be stimulated to serve as MESs to compensate the LCS
overload.
In the literature, many research works study MES schedul-
ing to balance the power supply and demand effectively. The
work in [5] utilizes MESs to transmit energy from renewable
energy plants to CSs and minimizes the MES transmission
loss. MESs can also provide demand response service to
charge or discharge energy depending on user needs as in the
work [6]. In our previous work [4], we propose to use MESs
that belong to the PSO to fulfill energy compensation tasks
among a group of CSs (GCS). Most related works consider
that MESs fully comply with PSO commands. However, the
MESs we schedule in this work are private-owned. These
MESs have their own travelling plans, and the energy com-
pensation service is considered as an additional on-road task
rather than a mandatory task. Therefore, the PSO needs to
provide additional incentive for these MESs to accomplish the
overload compensation task.
As a well-developed mathematical model, game theory can
precisely characterize incentive interactions between MESs
and the PSO. Specifically, the PSO first posts the service price
of energy compensation and then, in response to the posted
price, MESs decide their service amount. This price-service
interaction can be formulated by a sequential game model,
such as the Stackelberg game for the interaction analysis. The
Stackelberg game model has been applied in PEV charging
scheduling [7]-[9]. In the work [7], the CS is considered as
the leader to maximize its charging revenue while PEVs are
considered as followers to maximize their charging energy
fairly. When scheduling PEV charging among a GCS, the
GCS can be managed together by the PSO to maximize the
overall energy utilization and revenue as in the work [8], or
CSs can compete with each other to form a multi-leader multi-
follower game as in the work [9]. Stackelberg game can also
be applied for PEV discharging as in the work [10], where
the CS adjusts its price to maximize its charging and vehicle-
to-grid service revenue. While PEV charging and discharging
scheduling has been explored in the above works, their primary
focus is on PEV in-station scheduling. However, in the case
of MES scheduling, the service process becomes much more
complicated. For MESs to accomplish energy compensation
tasks, they are motivated to charge and discharge at the CSs
along their travel routes. Therefore, the costs of additional
battery degradation and service time should be considered.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where the PSO
stimulates on-road MESs by providing service incentive to
mitigate the LCS overload. Our main contributions are as
follows:
• A price-incentive scheme is proposed to stimulate MESs
participating in the service by increasing their service
revenues. The proposed scheme also guarantees a cost-
efficient overload mitigation from the PSO perspective.
• A Stackelberg game is formulated to characterize the
interaction between the PSO and MESs, where the PSO
acts as the leader and MESs act as followers. The
existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium
are validated, and an algorithm is designed to find the
equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model is introduced in Section II. The Stackelberg
game is formulated in Section III, followed by the game
analysis in Section IV. The simulation results are presented
in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, the system model consists of a GCS, on-
road MESs, the PSO, and communication infrastructures. The
system model analysis time window H is partitioned into H
time slots with equal interval of ∆t. Consider the MES energy
compensation service is fulfilled within ∆t, and the MES
scheduling is regularly conducted at each time slot h ∈ H.
We consider that a GCS is composed of RCSs and LCSs
that are geographically reachable by vehicles. RCSs, a set of
CSs denoted by R = {R1, R2 . . . Ri}, are normally deployed
at urban areas with sufficient power supplies. In addition to
charging arriving PEVs with charging demands, the surplus
energy of RCSs can be stored by MESs and delivered to
LCSs. LCSs, a set of CSs denoted by L = {L1, L2 . . . Lj}, are
usually deployed at rural areas with limited power capacities
and thus could encounter overload issues at peak hours. At
time h, RCS Ri sends information of its surplus energy Ei,h
to the PSO while LCS Lj sends information of its minimal
demanding energy DLj,h and maximal demanding energy D
U
j,h
to the PSO. Both information is sent via wired communication
technology such as fiber optic.
A set of on-road MESs, denoted as K = {1, . . . k, . . .K},
can serve the energy compensation tasks when their planned
travel routes pass the PSO’s targeted RCSs and LCSs. Upon
receiving service requests, on-road MESs send information of
their planned travel routes and energy compensation capacities
to the PSO. As MESs are constantly moving along the road,
mobile-support wireless communication technology can be
adopted for the information exchange between MESs and the
PSO. For example, vehicle ad-hoc networks (VANETs) can be
adopted to transmit the vehicle information to the PSO through
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)/vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) com-
munication.
Upon receiving information from MESs and CSs, the PSO
first estimates the on-road MES service capacity. If an MES
RCS
LCS
Fig. 1. System model.
plans to travel from RCS Ri to LCS Lj, the MES is counted
as an energy compensation server for Ri−Lj pair. By the end,
PSO knows the number of MESs Nij that can deliver energy
from RCS Ri to LCS Lj. Then, by analyzing the energy states
of CSs, the PSO posts the service price to on-road MESs to
stimulate them providing energy compensation service.
III. GAME FORMULATION
In terms of time-variant GCS balance states, the interaction
between the PSO and MESs is formulated as a Stackelberg
game at h-th time slot. As the MES scheduling is conducted
at each time slot, the notation h is omitted.
A. Game Process
We define the game in its strategic form: G = {{K ∪
{PSO}}, {p}, {ek}k∈K, {UP}, {Uk}k∈K}, where {ek}k∈K
denotes the set of strategies of MESs. {p} denotes the PSO
strategy (i.e., pricing); {UP} and {Uk}k∈K represent utility
functions of the PSO and MESs, respectively. For a given
service price p by the PSO, the interaction between MESs is
characterized as a non-cooperative game as follows:
• Players: the set of MESs K.
• Strategies: MES k ∈ K, chooses an energy service
amount ek.
• Payoffs: the k-th MES receives utility Uk(ek, p).
To find the Nash equilibrium, we need to find the best
response function e⋆k(p) of k-th MES under the service price
p. The set of best response functions {e⋆k(p)}k∈K is then sent
to the PSO. PSO chooses the optimal service price p⋆ that
maximizes its utility function UP(p, {e
⋆
k(p)}k∈K).
B. MES Model
For MES k ∈ K, its utility function is defined as:
Uk(ek, p) = pek + p(ek − e¯)− α
T
k C
T
k − α
D
k C
D
k . (1)
The first term in equation (1) is the service reward calculated
by multiplying the MES served energy amount with the service
price. The second term is the motivation reward that motivates
MES providing energy more than the expected average service
amount e¯. e¯ is calculated by averaging the overall LCS min-
imal demands by the overall on-road MES number, denoted
as e¯ = (
∑
Lj∈L
DLj )/(
∑
Ri∈R
∑
Lj∈L
Nij). When the MES
provides less energy than e¯, the motivation reward is negative,
meaning that the MES receives less reward than the service
reward. On the contrary, when the MES provides more service
energy than e¯, it will be rewarded more than service reward.
The third term is the weighted service time cost that is the
multiplication of the service time weight αTk of MES k, and
the service time CTk of MES k. The service time consists of
MES charging time at its passing RCS Ri and discharging
time at its destined LCS Lj, which is denoted as:
CTk =
ek
Pi
+
ek
Pj
, (2)
where Pi and Pj denote average charging/discharging power
of Ri and Lj respectively. The travelling time is excluded
from the utility function as Ri and Lj are on the MES planed
travel route. The weight of service time cost αTk indicates the
MES driver preference towards service time and αTk > 0. A
high αTk indicates that MES driver is unwilling to spend too
much time in-station. The forth term of the function is the
weighted battery degradation cost of MES discharging at LCS.
It is calculated as the multiplication of the battery degradation
weight αDk of k-th MES and the battery degradation cost C
D
k
of k-th MES. The battery degradation cost refers to a modified
model as in the work [11]:
CDk = (β1P
3
j + β2P
2
j + β3Pj + β4)(α1
e2k
B2k
+ α2
ek
Bk
). (3)
The term of discharging power degradation, β1P
3
j + β2P
2
j +
β3Pj + β4, is a cubic function with coefficients β1, β2, β3,
and β4. It is positively related to discharging power Pj at the
MES destined LCS Lj. The term of depth-of-discharge (DoD)
degradation, α1
e2k
B2
k
+ α2
ek
Bk
, is a quadratic function that is
positively related to the battery DoD ekBk , and thus coefficient
α1 > 0. Similar to α
T
k , a high degradation weight α
D
k denotes
a high unwillingness to discharge. To simplify the equation,
we denote Dk = β1P
3
j + β2P
2
j + β3Pj + β4 > 0.
Meanwhile, the MES service energy should be within its
feasible range:
0 ≤ ek ≤ Bk − e
I
k, (4)
where Bk denotes the k-th MES battery capacity and e
I
k
denotes the initial state-of-charge (SoC) of MES k. MESs
will not participate in the service when they cannot obtain
any profit, and thus the utility function needs to satisfy:
Uk(ek, p) > 0. (5)
Therefore, given the posted price p, the MES decision making
process is formulated as an optimization problem:
max
ek
Uk(ek, p) (6)
s.t. (4), (5), ∀k ∈ K.
C. PSO Model
As the operator of the GCS, the PSO adjusts the posted
price to maximize its utility function, which is denoted as:
UP(p, ek) = αL
∑
Lj∈L
(−(aj
∑
k∈Λj
ek − bj)
2 + cj)
− (
∑
k∈K
pek +
∑
k∈K
p(ek − e¯)). (7)
The first term is the weighted loading revenue that is the prod-
uct of loading weight αL and the summation of LCS loading
revenues. Denote a set of MESs whose destined LCS is Lj as
Λj. For LCS Lj, the loading revenue increases as more energy
delivered to the station and reaches the peak revenue at the
maximal demanding load DUj . Therefore, the loading revenue
of LCS Lj is characterized as a quadratic function with its peak
value at DUj . We set aj = 5 × 10
−4DUj , bj = ajD
U
j , cj = b
2
j .
The second term of the function is the summation of all MES
service costs and motivation costs, as introduced in Section
III-B.
For LCS Lj, the MES delivered energy should be within
its demanding energy range [DLj , D
U
j ]. Thus, the LCS energy
constraint is denoted as:
DLj ≤
∑
k∈Λj
ek ≤ D
U
j , ∀Lj ∈ L. (8)
On the energy supplier side, the energy stored by MESs cannot
exceed the maximal surplus energy capacities at RCSs. Denote
a set of MESs whose passing RCS is Ri as Ωi. Then, the RCS
energy constraint is denoted as:
∑
k∈Ωi
ek ≤ Ei, ∀Ri ∈ R. (9)
Therefore, the price decision process is formulated as an
optimization problem as:
max
p
UP(ek, p) (10)
s.t. (8), (9).
IV. GAME ANALYSIS
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Stackelberg Game
By solving problem (6), we can obtain the best-response
strategy of MES k, denoted as e⋆k(p). When followers are
at Nash equilibrium, all followers choose their best-response
strategies and the strategy set is denoted as {e⋆k(p)}k∈K =
{e⋆1(p), . . . , e
⋆
K(p)}. Given MES best-response strategy profile,
the optimal price p⋆ can be obtained by solving problem (10).
Therefore, the profile of (p⋆, {e⋆k(p)}k∈K) is the Stackelberg
equilibrium for the proposed game, which is calculated as:
(p⋆, {e⋆k(p)}k∈K) = argmax
p
UP(p, {e
⋆
k(p)}k∈K) (11)
s.t. e⋆k(p) = argmaxUk(ek, p), k ∈ K.
We first analyze the follower-level game by computing MES
best-response strategy in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. MES k has a unique best-response strategy e⋆k(p)
for a given service price p, denoted as:
e⋆k(p) =


0, p ≤ pLk
2p−αTk
Pi+Pj
PiPj
−αDk α2Dk/Bk
2α1αDk Dk/B
2
k
, pLk < p < p
U
k
Bk − e
I
k, p ≥ p
U
k
(12)
where pLk is the rejection price, below which MES k will not
provide service. pUk is the saturated price at which MES k
provides maximal service capacity. pLk and p
U
k are denoted
as:


pLk = 0.5(α
T
k
Pi+Pj
PiPj
+ αDk α2Dk/Bk)
pUk = p
L
k + α1α
D
k Dk(Bk − e
I
k)/B
2
k
(13)
Proof: For MES k, the strategy set is denoted as {ek|ek ∈
R, 0 ≤ ek ≤ Bk − e
I
k}, which is the intersection of two half-
spaces. Thus, the MES strategy set is non-empty and convex.
To find the best-response strategy of k-th MES, we solve the
optimization problem (6). First, we analyze the property of the
objective function Uk(ek, p) by calculating the second-order
derivative of the function:
∂2Uk(ek, p)
∂e2k
= −2αDk α1Dk. (14)
As αDk , α1, Dk > 0, the value of equation (14) is negative.
Thus, problem (6) is proven to be a convex optimization
problem, and the best response strategy for MES k is the
global optimum. By applying Lagrangian function and Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to problem (6), we can obtain
the best response strategy of MES k. The detailed calculation
is omitted due to space limitations.
Based on the MES best-response strategy, we define the
feasible range of service price p. The PSO adjusts its price
within the range between the minimal and maximal value
of prange , [p
L
1 . . . p
L
K, p
U
1 . . . p
U
K]. When the price is below
min{prange}, all MESs will not participate in the service.
When the price reaches max{prange}, all MESs will use up
their battery space for the service and no higher price is
needed. By calculating pLk and p
U
k for MES k using equation
(13), and sorting all pLk and p
U
k in an ascending order, we have
the feasible set of the price. The price set is an M -element
vector γ, where γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γm ≤ γm+1 . . . γM. Further,
define Γm , [γm, γm+1] for m = 1, 2, . . .M − 1, we can
divide the price p range into M − 1 intervals.
To find the optimal price for PSO, we decompose problem
(10) into M − 1 sub-problems where the m-th sub-problem
aims to find the optimal price within the range Γm, similar to
the work in [12].
Lemma 2. In the sub-domain of Γm, ∀m, problem (10) is a
convex optimization problem.
Proof: As the price is continuous within Γm, the price
set is convex. By substituting the MES best-response strategy
into problem (10), the objective function is calculated as:
UP(p,Γm) =
αL
∑
Lj∈L
(−(aj(
∑
k∈Λj∩φ1
(ykp−zk)+
∑
k∈Λj∩φ2
(Bk−e
I
k))−bj)
2+cj)
− 2p(
∑
k∈φ1
(ykp− zk) +
∑
k∈φ2
(Bk − e
I
k)) +
∑
k∈K
pe¯, (15)
where ykp−zk is the simplied function of e
⋆
k for p
L
k < p < p
U
k .
For MESs with non-zero best-response value within Γm, they
are divided into two sets: φ1 and φ2, where φ1 = {k|ykp −
zk < Bk − e
I
k} and φ2 = {k|ykp − zk ≥ Bk − e
I
k}. As p
L
k
and pUk are deterministic and irrelevant to p, φ1 and φ2 are
deterministic and fixed. The second derivative of the utility
function is calculated as:
∂2UP(p,Γm)
∂p2
= −2αL
∑
Lj∈L
a2j
∑
k∈Λi∩φ1
y2k − 4
∑
k∈φ1
yk, (16)
where αL, aj, yk > 0. Thus, ∂
2UP(p,Γm)/∂p
2 < 0, making
the utility function concave and differential. Moreover, by sub-
stituting equation (13) to constraints (8), (9), both constraints
are convex (half-space). Therefore, problem (10) within the
sub-domain Γm is a convex optimization problem.
Lemma 3. The PSO has a globally optimal price, given the
best-response strategies of MESs.
Proof: By decomposing problem (10) into M − 1 sub-
problems as defined in Lemma 2, the original problem can be
rewritten as:
max
m
max
p∈Γm
UP(p,Γm) (17)
s.t. (8), (9).
By obtaining the optimal result p⋆m of the convex sub-
problem following Lemma 2, we can find the globally op-
timal price p⋆ by searching the maximum utility value from
[p⋆1, . . . , p
⋆
m, . . . , p
⋆
M−1]:
p⋆ = argmax
p∈[p⋆1 ,...,p
⋆
m,...,p
⋆
M−1
]
UP(p,Γm) (18)
s.t. (8), (9).
Thus, the existences and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilib-
rium can be proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For the formulated game, a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium exists.
Proof: As shown in Lemma 1, each MES has a unique
best-response strategy e⋆k(p) given a posted price p . Then,
by substituting e⋆k(p) to problem (10), we prove the global
optimum of PSO strategy as in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. As the
PSO achieves its global optimum and each MES has a unique
best-response strategy, the unique Stackelberg equilibrium is
obtained.
B. Stackelberg Game Algorithm
During each scheduling time slot h, the PSO scheduling
price can be obtained as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Stackelberg game solution.
1 for k=1 to K do
2 Calculate pL
k
and pL
k
according to equation (13) ;
3 Sorting pL
k
and pL
k
in an ascending order to form vectors γ and Γ
for m=1 to M-1 do
4 Find p⋆m by solving problem (10) within [Γm,Γm+1];
5 Find the optimal p⋆ with the maximal utility value according to
equation (18).
The proposed algorithm does not require iterations to ana-
lyze the Stackelberg game. As the number of MESs increases,
the algorithm complexity increases accordingly. Thus, the
proposed algorithm can be applied to schedule a large number
of MESs.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we
present simulation results in this section. The parameter setting
is shown in Table I. RCSs R1 has 1.6MWh and R2 has
900kWh surplus energy for MESs to deliver. LCS L1 demands
100-200kWh energy to be delivered while L2 demands energy
between 150-300kWh. RCSs adopt society of automotive engi-
neers (SAE) combined charging system (CCS) level 2 charging
standard at 90kW and LCSs adopt SAE CCS charging standard
at 60kW [13]. The number of MESs Nij along the Ri-Lj
pair is also included in Table I. The MES service capacities
are considered as random variables that follow a normal
distribution with a mean value of 14 and a standard deviation
of 5 (kWh). Similarly, the MES battery capacities also follow
a normal distribution with an 80kWh mean and a standard
deviation of 10kWh. The battery degradation parameters Dk,
α1, α2, α3 are calculated according to data in the work [14].
While the MES battery degradation cost is relatively low (e.g.,
4×10−4) per cycle, it is still a great concern for MES drivers.
Thus, αDk is set to 10
5 and αTk is set to 30 to make them
comparable with service reward and motivation reward. The
loading cost weight αL is set to 0.5.
We compare the proposed scheme with the price-minimized
scheme and random scheme in terms of PSO utility revenue,
as shown in Fig. 2. In the price-minimized scheme, the PSO
aims to minimize its service price. In the random scheme, the
PSO randomly adjusts the service price to meet LCS energy
demands. It can be seen that the proposed scheme has the
highest utility revenue compared with both price-minimized
and random schemes as the price-minimized scheme only tries
to minimize the price, but ignores the loading revenue impact
on the utility function. Compared to the price-minimized
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Para. Value Para. Value
E1 1.6MWh E2 900kWh
DL1 100kWh D
U
1 200kWh
DL2 150kWh D
U
2 300kWh
PR1/R2 90kW PL1/L2 60kW
N11 6 N12 8
N21 7 N22 4
E(ek) 14kWh σ(ek) 5kWh
E(Bk) 80kWh σ(Bk) 10kWh
αTk 30 α
D
k 10
5
Dk 5.08×10
−4 α1 1
α2 -0.222 αL 0.5
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Fig. 2. PSO utility revenue with different MES service capacities.
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Fig. 3. Impact of on-road MES number on energy scheduling.
scheme, the random scheme schedules more MESs and can
achieve higher revenue as it does not put strict constraints to
achieve minimal loading demands. Moreover, as MES service
capacities increase, the PSO utility increases. Since there are
more on-road service capacities, a lower service price can be
posted and the PSO can have a high loading revenue. For the
price-minimized scheme, the revenue increment is smaller as
it provides minimal LCS loading demands and the loading
revenue stays almost the same.
We also discuss the energy scheduling scheme under differ-
ent operation scenarios. The impact of on-road MES number
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Fig. 4. Impact of the loading weight on energy scheduling.
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Fig. 5. Impact of the battery degradation weight on energy scheduling.
on the scheduling result is shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen
that as the on-road MES number increases, the service price
decreases since the PSO has more potential energy servers, and
less motivation is required. Correspondingly, the PSO utility
revenue increases. Moreover, with more MESs participating
in the service, more energy can be delivered to LCSs, which
increases the loading revenue part of the utility.
Depending on the PSO operation goal, the MES scheduling
could lean towards operation cost minimization or loading
revenue maximization. By adjusting the loading weight αL,
the operation objectives vary, and the scheduling result also
changes, as shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that as the loading
weight increases, the MES scheduling mainly focuses on
loading revenue maximization. To encourage MESs delivering
more energy, the service price increases until αL reaches
0.6. We can observe from the figure that when αL = 0.6,
the loading at L1 reaches its maximal demanding load D
U
1 .
Therefore, a higher loading weight will result in the same
loading results as limited by the loading constraints, and the
service price will remain the same.
As the battery technology advances, the MES driver’s pref-
erence towards energy discharging also changes. Therefore, we
discuss the battery degradation weight impact on scheduling
results, as shown in Fig. 5. As the weight αDk increases, MES
drivers are more reluctant to discharge energy, and the price
range prange becomes wider. Therefore, to stimulate MESs
actively fulfilling the tasks, PSO needs to post a higher service
price. As a result, the operation cost increases, and the PSO
utility revenue decreases accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a price-incentive scheme that stimulates MESs
fulfilling energy compensation tasks has been proposed to
mitigate overload issues at LCSs. The interaction between the
PSO and on-road MESs has been formulated as a Stackelberg
game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilib-
rium have been proven, and an algorithm has been designed
to find the equilibrium. Simulation results have validated the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme under different operation
scenarios. The proposed scheme can be applied by the local
PSO to balance the system energy without excessive power
infrastructure upgrade while MESs are stimulated to fulfill
tasks in a cost-efficient way.
For our future works, we will consider unexpected errors
during MES service (e.g., human behaviour, loading change,
etc.) to enable robust energy scheduling.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Lindquist and M. Wendt, “Electric vehicle policies, fleet, and infras-
tructure: Synthesis”, Washington State Department of Transportation,
Tacoma, WA, Tech. Rep., Nov. 2011.
[2] R. Leou, C. Su and C. Lu, “Stochastic analyses of electric vehicle
charging impacts on distribution network,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst.,
vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 1055-1063, May 2014.
[3] V. Monteiro, J. C. Ferreira, A. A. N. Mele´ndez, C. Couto and J.
L. Afonso, “Experimental validation of a novel architecture based on
a dual-stage converter for off-board fast battery chargers of electric
vehicles”, IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 1000-1011,
Feb. 2018.
[4] N. Chen, J. Ma, M. Wang and X. Shen, “Two-tier energy compensation
framework based on mobile vehicular electric storage,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 67, no. 12, pp. 11719-11732, Dec. 2018.
[5] P. Yi, Y. Tang, Y. Hong, Y. Shen, T. Zhu, Q. Zhang and M. M. Begovic,
“Renewable energy transmission through multiple routes in a mobile
electrical grid,” in 2014 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies
(ISGT), Washington, DC, 2014, pp. 1-5.
[6] W. Zhong, R. Yu, S. Xie, Y. Zhang and D. K. Y. Yau, “On stability and
robustness of demand response in V2G mobile energy networks,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 3203-3212, July 2018.
[7] H. Yang, X. Xie and A. V. Vasilakos, “Noncooperative and cooperative
optimization of electric vehicle charging under demand uncertainty: A
robust Stackelberg game,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65, no. 3, pp.
1043-1058, Mar. 2016.
[8] I. S. Bayram, G. Michailidis and M. Devetsikiotis, “Unsplittable load
balancing in a network of charging stations under QoS guarantees,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 1292-1302, May 2015.
[9] W. Yuan, J. Huang and Y. J. A. Zhang, “Competitive charging station
pricing for plug-in electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 8,
no. 2, pp. 627-639, Mar. 2017.
[10] X. Chen and K. Leung, “A game theoretic approach to vehicle-to-
grid scheduling,” in IEEE Global Communication Conference (GLOBE-
COM), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 2018, pp. 1-6.
[11] A. Ahmadian, M. Sedghi, B. Mohammadi-ivatloo, A. Elkamel, M. Ali-
akbar Golkar and M. Fowler, “Cost-benefit analysis of V2G implemen-
tation in distribution networks considering PEVs battery degradation,”
IEEE Trans. Sustainable Energy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 961-970, Apr. 2018.
[12] M. Li, J. Gao, L. Zhao and X. Shen, “Task time allocation and
reward scheme for PEV charging station advertising,” in 2019 IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), Shanghai, China,
May 20-24, 2019.
[13] IEEE Standard Technical Specifications of a DC Quick Charger for Use
with Electric Vehicles, IEEE Std 2030.1.1-2015 Std., 2016.
[14] C. Guenther, B. Schott, W. Hennings, P. Waldowski and M. A. Danzer,
“Model-based investigation of electric vehicle battery aging by means
of vehicle-to-grid scenario simulations,” J. Power Sources, vol. 239, no.
1, pp. 604-610, Oct. 2013.
